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Comparing Media 
The aim of this article is to shed light on the mechanisms evoking self-imagining in 
different media with a focus on computer games. Before zooming in on the topic of 
self-imagining, however, it is useful to ask to what extent computer games can be 
compared to traditional media such as literature and film. At the 2005 Digital Arts and 
Culture conference, Espen Aarseth presented a short paper titled “The Perception of 
Doors: Fiction vs. Simulation in Games.” In this paper he claims that there is a 
fundamental difference between ‘the virtual’ as it is found in online worlds, computer 
games, virtual reality environments etc. on the one hand and fiction as it exists in 
traditional, fixed, non-participatory media such as novels, films, comics etc. on the 
other. Important to note is that Aarseth does not aim for an extension of the notion of 
fiction so that it would encompass computer games but rather declares the 
independence of the virtual realm to which he refers as “a different type of world, 
between fiction and our world” (2), a quality Jesper Juul will later describe as half-real 
(Juul 2005). For Aarseth, computer games simulate a reality rather than narrate it 
and should hence be seen as fundamentally different from fiction rather than as one 
of its modalities. If we were to accept this point of view, comparison between more 
traditional narrative media (such as literature and film) and computer games would 
turn become problematic. 
As a definition of ‘reality’, Aarseth refers to Philip K. Dick’s somewhat cynical 
description of it as “that which, when you stop believing in it, doesn't go away” 
(quoted in Aarseth 2005, p. 1). Fiction, then, is that which is imagined and will 
automatically go away when a person stops imagining. For Aarseth, reality is that 
which exists independently from a person whereas fiction cannot exist without 
someone imagining it. The virtual, then, is semi-real; it is not real in the sense that 
reality is real, but neither is it as exclusively dependent on the subjective imagination 
as fiction. As an illustration of the difference between the virtual and the fictional, 
Aarseth proposes to look at the phenomenon of painted-on doors in computer 
games. Because of a lack of computing power or design resources, or simply not to 
divert the player too much, many computer games contain objects such as doors 
which are not coded as entities of the simulation but exist only as dummy polygonal 
shapes or textures. When moving their avatar through a corridor, for example, a 
player could observe a door, try to walk through it, and only upon zooming in on it 
notice that it is a blown-up bitmap rather than a modelled door. These ‘fake’ doors, 
which are meant as mere ornament, often coexist with actually modelled doors that 
open. For Aarseth, the painted-on, ornamental doors are fictional because they only 
exist as a door when the player imagines them as such whereas modelled doors are 
virtual because they function as a real door within the simulated world. They are not 
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real in the sense that a real door is real, but they nonetheless function independently 
from the imagination in that they open and close within the simulated world. 
If we were to accept Aarseth’s radical distinction between the fictional and the virtual, 
comparing self-imagining across media would become problematic. If the status of 
doors in fictional forms such as novels and films is fundamentally different from that 
of virtual doors in computer games, then the same must be true for characters. And if 
the status of fictional characters is radically different from virtual ones, then our 
relation to them must be different from the outset as well. But are doors and 
characters in novels or films as radically different from those in games as Aarseth 
implies? Is the difference between, say, a door described in a novel and one shown 
in a film not at least as great? Indeed, it can be claimed that the shape of a door in a 
novel is ‘invented’ by the reader whereas that in a film can actually be seen! Is the 
question of what constitutes fiction then not a matter of cultural acceptance rather 
than essence, and is it not possible that games, as they move more firmly into the 
mainstream, will become accepted as just another manifestation of fiction like film 
has eventually been accepted? Aarseth’s observations usefully point to a clash 
between different types of representation, but they hardly justify a claim to ontological 
difference. If we would transpose the discussion from the realm of computer games 
to that of toys, for example, Aarseth’s position would imply that the eyes and mouths 
of LEGO men belong to an ontologically different category than their arms and legs 
because the latter can move and the former cannot. This article will take a more 
moderate position in claiming that, despite differences in engagement, the fictional 
and the virtual depend on the same imaginative faculties of a person and can 
therefore be studied and compared within one theoretical framework. 
 
Playing the Imagination 
The theoretical foundation of this article, mainly because of its dealing with self-
imagining, will be American philosopher Kendall Walton’s work on representation as 
make-believe (1976, 1990, 1993). Walton starts from the observation that imagining 
and make-believe are a fundamental part of human nature. Children spend large 
amounts of time on apparently purposeless and dysfunctional make-believe activities 
such as making up stories, acting them out, impersonating others, playing with toys, 
dressing up, imitating grown-ups, etc. They engage in these activities alone and with 
peers, adding an element of negotiation to the mix. Sometimes they start playing like 
that, without clearly identifiable triggers, and sometimes they start associating based 
on objects or events occurring in their environment, often using these objects as 
props in their play. Walton’s claim, then, is that, as we grow up, whilst we obviously 
reduce the amount of time that we engage in make-believe, we far from ban it from 
our lives. Rather, we direct it towards a different category of objects and activities 
and we give it different names such as literature, art, culture, theatre, cinema etc. For 
Walton, the mechanisms that are at work when a grown-up looks at a painting or 
reads a book are the same as those triggering a child into imagining that they are a 
cowboy upon noticing a revolver-shaped tree branch. Artefacts devised for 
representing such as novels, films, paintings etc. are meant to trigger a person into a 
playful form of imagining. They seduce a person into imagining the scenes suggested 
by their words, colours or moving images. In Walton’s terms, representation (or 
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mimesis) is a process whereby a person is prompted into imagining a scene and 
enters a game of make-believe in which the representing object serves as a prop. 
Walton’s work presents a useful alternative to perspectives such as the 
sender/message/receiver model derived from mass-communication theory and 
structuralist semiotic models in that it does not see a representation as such because 
of a supposed relationship with a real object (its referent) or because it is part of a 
linguistic or communicative act. Rather, in Walton’s theory, an object represents 
something because it makes us imagine that something by drawing us into a game of 
make-believe. This is useful when we want to look at computer games as a form of 
representation in that it removes the need to double the computer as a sender or see 
the game as a ‘message’ from the game designer. Moreover, it removes the need to 
see game play as an endless series of communications between man and machine 
or visuals and interactivity as discrete signs or symbols. Rather, representation is 
seen as a process of imagining, of engaging the human ability to think of and 
visualise objects and scenes. Computer games are artefacts designed to engage us 
in imaginative play either alone or with others. Humans are imaginative creatures and 
we have devised a highly diverse set of tools for sharing that imagination of which a 
computer game is just one of the more recent manifestations. 
Walton’s framework is not entirely unproblematic, however. The most fundamental 
challenge it faces is the question of the status of non-fiction – say a newspaper 
article, a biography or an animal documentary – vis-à-vis the real world. On the one 
hand, the theory states that all representation is a matter of make-believe, of objects 
evoking scenes in the imagination of the beholder. On the other, Walton presents his 
ideas as a logical framework, as a theory of how fiction should be seen as a species 
of truth. By assigning a primary role to the imagination, however, the fundamental 
status of truth in fiction becomes shaky. When you accept that the meaning of 
images and text depends on someone’s imagination, it becomes hard to claim that it 
consists of fundamental truths. Walton recognises this problem and makes several 
attempts at solving it. He fails to question the logical underpinnings of his theory, 
however, and, rather than rethink his notion of fictional truth, opts to redefine the 
concept of representation altogether by restricting it to fiction. Fiction only represents 
reality whereas non-fiction maintains “another relation that may obtain between 
representations and things in the world, (…) matching” (108). For Walton, “‘matching’ 
is complete correspondence between a representation and something in the world. 
(...) [A] man-picture matches a man if the man is in every detail exactly like 'the man 
in the picture'. A story matches a person if that person is and does everything that a 
character in the story is and does” (Ibid.). But how can a picture match a person in 
every respect when it is flat and static and how can a story do so when it fails to 
describe their every thought, wrinkle, heartbeat? In a way, Walton underestimates 
the power of his own make-believe framework which indeed makes all representation 
relative to a person’s imagining, reinterpreting non-fiction as a question of intention 
and pretence. A documentary and a newspaper article are just as ‘fictional’ in the 
sense of ‘imagined’ as a movie or a novel except for the fact that they are intended 
and therefore pretend to correspond to a reality. Interestingly, when it comes to 
computer games, non-fiction was already a problematic category anyway as it is 
difficult to see how, say, a WWII game can be non-fictional when the outcome of its 
events are undecided, which is a prerequisite for it to qualify as a game. 
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Entertaining Alice 
To evaluate the applicability of Walton’s framework to cross-media comparative 
research into self-imagining, a case-study has been carried out. For ease of 
comparison, three instances of Alice in Wonderland were picked, i.e. the 1865 novel 
by Lewis Caroll, the 1951 Disney animated film and the 2000 computer game 
American McGee’s Alice developed by Rogue Entertainment. The main goal of the 
analysis has been to look at the strategy and techniques employed by the various 
works to engage a person in their content, analyse their effects on the mental 
positioning of the imagined self, and relate these to their respective media and 
technologies. After introducing the three works under consideration, the analysis 
describes the techniques used for entertainment and the relations these bear to the 
medium’s specific characteristics. In the next section, Walton’s concepts of subjective 
and objective imagining are introduced to describe the relative positioning of the 
imagined self vis-à-vis the imagined scenes and events. These concepts will then be 
applied to the Alice material. Finally, the outcome of the analysis will be fed back to 
the theoretical framework which will result in a number of theoretical considerations 
and directions for future research. 
The original novel Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland by Lewis Carroll was published 
in 1865. It is a story about Alice, a little girl who tumbles down a rabbit hole into her 
own fantasy world filled with talking animals, mythological creatures and crazy royalty 
who seem only interested in playing croquet and beheading their subjects. The book 
sketches a hazy, dreamy atmosphere through which Alice wanders from one 
encounter to the next without a clear plan or observable progress. It is generally seen 
as an example of ‘literary nonsense’, a genre that is known for its play with language, 
literary convention and logic. Walt Disney’s 1951 animation film Alice in Wonderland 
is an adaptation using elements from both the original book and its sequel Through 
the Looking-Glass (Carroll 1871). It heavily relies on comedy, dance, singing and 
action as sources of amusement. It is known for its cheerful and dreamy atmosphere 
and its use of bright colours epitomising Disney’s style. American McGee’s Alice 
(2000), finally, is a 3D third-person action-adventure PC game featuring puzzle and 
platform game elements. Rather than being a direct adaptation, it is a continuation 
set about a decade after the original and inspired by Carroll’s books and the Disney 
film. A fire in Alice’s home has killed her family. Alice has survived but she has 
developed psychiatric problems and has been placed in a mental asylum. Along with 
her mind, Alice’s imaginary wonderland and its inhabitants have drifted into insanity. 
The player’s task is to assume Alice’s role, return to Wonderland and set things 
straight by defeating the evil Queen of Hearts. Reaching this goal will make Alice 
recover from her mental problems, leave the asylum, and step into the world as a 
newborn, confident young woman.2 
When comparing the three works, it is clear that they deal with the same content, 
which could be referred to as ‘story’, but that would not be entirely justified as the film 
uses elements from two Alice books and the computer game tells a different story 
altogether. In fact it can be argued that Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland is not a 
story in the traditional sense in the first place. There is an exposition and then a 
disruption of the equilibrium as Alice tumbles down the well. From that moment, 
however, the story loses direction, largely failing to move towards any definite climax 
or resolution. Rather, it turns into a meandering associative journey through Alice’s 
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fantasy world which functions as a framework for introducing colourful characters, 
absurd situations and playful spectacles. Interestingly, despite their use of different 
media, this basic structure is present in all three incarnations only in a slightly 
different form. Despite the fact that they use different techniques to entertain, the 
three works present a common strategy in that they focus on playful spectacle rather 
than tension-building to engage the imagination. The book makes extensive use of 
different types of word-play such as nonsense (e.g. “Why is a raven like a writing 
desk?”), absurdity (e.g. unbirthdays), coinage (e.g. jabberwocky) and different types 
of bent logic such as faulty cause and effect (e.g. the mouse trying to dry the other 
animals by reading an extremely dry text). Not all of its techniques can be directly 
tied to the medium, however, as a lot of the spectacle is visual rather than verbal. 
There are the famous illustrations by John Tenniel, but there is more and this is 
where Walton’s approach pays off by focussing on the evoked imagining, the process 
of representation rather than the material characteristics of the representing object. 
Indeed, many of the scenes depicted in the book primarily rely on visual rather than 
verbal play for entertainment. One example is the growing scene in the rabbit’s 
house in which Alice is forced to lie down and eventually put her arm through the 
window so as not to wreck the construction. Finally, there are scenes which are at 
the same time visual and action-based, most notably the croquet match towards the 
end of the book, but more on that below. 
Like the book, the Disney animated film follows Alice on her episodic journey through 
Wonderland. Also like the book, the story is more of a frame than a tension-span, 
more of an introduction to and excuse for doing amusing things than a narrative 
build-up. What is different, however, is the nature of the spectacles that are staged. 
Whereas the book’s main emphasis is on word-play, rhyme and logic-games, the 
animated film plays out the assets of its medium by focusing on colour, movement 
and music. As in his earlier hit film Fantasia (1940), Disney relied on high-profile 
composers, animation artists and voice actors to create engaging characters and 
high-quality songs and choreographies. For example, the aforementioned drying 
scene is skipped altogether in favor of a caucus race, which is turned into a joyous 
yet chaotic round-dance of a colourful bunch of animals dragging Alice with them. 
Another example is the croquet match which was already a visual and action-
oriented scene in the book. In the film, it is spun out further with a manly, Miss Piggy-
like Queen as the star of the show and an undersized king as a clownish figure trying 
to placate his ill-tempered wife. Highly accentuated by sound effects and music, the 
scene depicts the card soldiers jumping into place so that their sovereign’s croquet 
shot cannot miss them. Not all spectacles are visual, however, as Carroll’s dialogues 
and rhymes still play an important role and some scenes present a hybrid between 
visual and verbal humour such as the one presenting the caterpillar puffing out his 
words in smoke from his hookah as he recites a nursery rhyme. 
American McGee’s Alice, finally, similarly presents the exploration of Wonderland 
and the encounters with its inhabitants as the main drivers of the experience. 
Although the events are reframed by a different story, by the game format and by its 
underlying technology, which is derived from the first-person shooter game Quake III 
Arena (id Software 1999; for a more extensive discussion see Van Looy 2008), the 
underlying strategy is similar. The Alice ‘situation’ is used as a background providing 
story elements, characters and scenery against which architecture, weaponry and 
game play are presented. It serves as a frame and an alibi for introducing all kinds of 
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spectacles and challenges: mostly fights and jumps, but also chases, puzzles and 
labyrinths. Like its predecessors, Alice primarily uses the Wonderland setting and its 
characters for showing off its medium’s strengths. Also like its predecessors, 
however, the picture is far from black and white. Apart from game elements, Alice 
also draws extensively on non-medium-specific techniques such as characterisation, 
visuals (most notably architecture), animation, dialogue and even word-play and 
rhyme. Thus, when comparing the game to its predecessors, it becomes clear that it 
employs a similar strategy, i.e. present a broad array of spectacles to generate 
entertainment. Without the non-medium-specific elements such as the Wonderland 
setting, the themed visuals, the characters, Carroll’s rhymes and especially the Alice 
character, the game experience would be significantly poorer. 
 
Imagining a Self 
From Walton’s perspective, all three works are designed with a similar purpose in 
mind, i.e. to evoke imagining. As such, they anticipate their own use and provide a 
role for the person engaging with them. This implicit role manifests itself in the 
object’s material characteristics – e.g. the size of the book, the number of frames per 
second for the film or the controls for the game – and in its content. The book, for 
example, is written in such a way that it seems as if someone is telling Alice’s story to 
someone else and that you as a reader happen to be the latter. The film turns the 
viewer into an onlooker who happens to follow Alice jumping from one spot to the 
next with each cut, changing angle and distance and sometimes moving along with 
her. The game, finally, most blatantly presents a role, i.e. that of a player controlling 
Alice by handling different controls such as the mouse and keyboard which are 
mapped onto the character’s movements. As such, the player is to ‘become’ Alice 
while playing the game, accept her mission, background, limitations and goals for the 
length of the playing session. These acts of role-taking are not necessarily conscious 
processes and they do not automatically coincide with self-imagining. The reader of 
Alice’s Adventures, for example, will automatically assume the role of the listener, but 
might at the same time imagine being Alice. Similarly, the film presents a structure of 
temporary associations with camera standpoints, but the focus is on the Alice 
character. The game, finally, is somewhat different in that a player more consciously 
assumes the role presented to them. Also, the associative mechanisms tend to 
overlap more as one is to assume the Alice role, play her rather than listen to a story 
about her or follow her from a distance. 
When discussing the relation between the imaginer and the imagined, i.e. the reader 
or viewer and a representation, Walton distinguishes between two types of imagining. 
When a person steps into a game of make-believe and starts imagining a scene 
based on an artefact, they can either place themselves within this scene or outside of 
it. When reading a poem such as John McCrae’s “The Anxious Dead” for example, 
they are expected to imagine themselves to be a soldier in the trenches in the West 
of Flanders in the First World War, wishing the grenades would stop exploding and 
peace would come. By imagining this experience in such a way, they would place 
themselves within the imagined scene. Walton refers to this phenomenon as de se or 
subjective imagining. Your imagining is primarily concerned with yourself. Most 
dreams, for example, are subjective. When playing a tabletop war game simulating 
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the 1916 Battle of the Somme, however, the chances that one will imagine oneself to 
be one of the soldiers in the field are slimmer. Rather, one will take an outside 
perspective and analyse troop strength, movement, terrain, logistics, potential 
artillery targets etc. Hence the events imagined revolve less around a version of the 
player than around the abstract mechanics of the war game. This type of imagining 
Walton refers to as de re or objective imagining. The imagining mechanism in itself is 
not so different from that of subjective imagining, but the place the ‘imaginer’ 
reserves for themselves is. When imagining objectively, one does not reserve a role 
for oneself in the imagined scene. Rather, the self, even if it is given agency within 
the imagined events as is the case for the war game setup, will be imagined as an 
external entity looking in. 
One possible objection against Walton’s distinction is that one could argue that, in 
the case of objective imagining, there is no imagining of a self involved at all, that one 
either imagines being in the picture or refrains from imagining about oneself 
altogether. Whilst this perspective is not without merit, it fails to explain one important 
factor, i.e. the fact that when one engages in representation, there is always some 
sense of self-positioning involved. There is always some commitment, at least 
temporary, towards the imagined scene. Think of a cleaning person dusting off a 
picture of the royal family before moving on to the bookshelves. There is no 
commitment to or engagement with the picture in terms of representation, only an 
instrumental relation. When this same person would, in passing, stop at the picture 
and respectfully bow their head, however, their engagement with the representation 
of the family would become part of a game of make-believe, imagining that the image 
in the frame is actually the royal family. The bowing then symbolises their humility 
towards them. Or think of Eastern European protesters in the early nineties, pulling 
down a statue of Lenin. Their engagement with the artefact was far from 
instrumental: they were imagining themselves bringing down communist tyranny by 
symbolically pulling down one of its icons. Interestingly, this implies that neither the 
type of imagining nor the assumed role is determined by the work. A few decades 
earlier, fervent communist supporters may have imagined themselves to have been 
part of the communist revolution being lead by Lenin on the streets of Petrograd. 
Finally, to complicate things even further, time-based representations present the 
additional challenge of continuous shifts in the equilibrium between objective and 
subjective imagining. The Lenin statue mentioned above presents a more or less 
constant configuration in time. One can therefore safely expect a person not to 
change their position towards it dramatically during one encounter (although one 
could walk around it and discover previously hidden aspects). Representations 
generated by books, films and computer games, however, are meant to develop over 
time, to present a flow of information rather than a fixed reference point. This stream 
of information can communicate different aspects of one fixed scene, as in a 
description, but most often it will present some kind of development involving one or 
more characters that are faced with a challenge and tracking their attempts at 
resolving it. As a story progresses, the perspective of the person engaging with it can 
shift (more often, but not exclusively, in novels and films; for some highly successful 
implementations of multiple-avatar games, see Van Looy 2003a). Moreover, by 
finding out more about a character and their predicament, one may become more 
sympathetic towards them or want to distance oneself from them. These changes 
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bear consequences for the way in which one imagines the depicted scenes and how 
one relates oneself to them. 
 
To Be or Not to Be (Alice) 
Making a superficial analysis of the Alice material in terms of objective/subjective 
imagining is easy enough. For example, the book presents an account by an unclear 
source of a little girl falling down a well. As a reader, one is supposed to ‘listen to’ 
Alice’s story, which is told in the third person by an omniscient narrative instance, 
one that knows absolutely everything: not just what is currently happening to her but 
also what went on before, her distant past and her inner feelings and thoughts. 
Logically, one would derive that Alice’s Adventures is an example of an objective 
representation, an artefact meant to stir the reader into imagining Alice’s amusing 
encounters from an outside point of view looking in. Similarly, the Disney animated 
film presents the viewer with a sort of off-road trip following Alice as she wanders 
through her dreamworld stumbling from adventure to adventure. Arguably, because 
of the sense of identification with the camera and the salience of the beautiful, blonde 
and blue-eyed, singing and dancing Alice, the film is an even more of a third-person 
experience than the book. Whereas in the book, it is primarily Alice’s thoughts and 
fantasies as ultimately materialised in Wonderland itself that are the stars of the 
show, in the film it is Alice’s outward appearance, her voice, movement etc. that are 
most prominent. The game then, finally, takes a different approach. Whereas the 
implied reader and viewer roles are only indirectly and passively related to the 
ongoing events presented through the narrator and director instances’ mediation, in 
the game the player is invited to take the driver’s seat themselves. Rather than listen 
to Alice’s account or follow her from camera standpoint to camera standpoint, the 
player is expected to take Alice’s role and fulfil her objectives. In other words, the 
player is meant to imagine that they are Alice, that they are a direct and active part of 
the imagined scene. Thus, the game could almost be seen as a device for subjective 
imagining, an active dream-generator as it were.  
However, It is all more complex than it seems at first sight. Despite the fact that the 
Alice novel primarily presents itself as an objective (in the technical sense of outside 
perspective) account, it also aims to establish a strong emotional bond between the 
reader and Alice, stepping up the subjectivity of the experience. A first obvious 
indicator of this is that the story focuses on the Alice character leaving her only a few 
times for a brief embedded story or rhyme. One of the consequences of this close 
focus is that, as the story progresses and Alice is confronted with different challenges 
such as how to shrink her body or act in an absurd situation, the reader will almost 
automatically place themselves in her shoes and look for a solution. This type of 
emotional relation adds a significant degree of subjectivity in the imagining. On a 
micro-level, there are several techniques that are used to initiate and strengthen this, 
most of which revolve around creating temporary affiliations between the reader’s 
and Alice’s perspective. The most prominent one is focalisation, which consists of 
temporarily placing the reader in Alice’s head by describing events from her 
perspective, seen through her eyes and using her language and conceptual 
framework as opposed to that of the omniscient narrator. Typically these focalised 
stretches present themselves as inner monologues combined with third person 
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pronouns. As she is falling down the rabbit hole and keeps on falling, Alice begins to 
wonder “Either the well was very deep, or she fell very slowly” (2). By presenting 
Alice’s thoughts in this way, the narrator pretends to temporarily step aside and give 
the reader direct access to Alice’s point of view. This is meant to draw the reader into 
the story environment and strengthen their identification with Alice. 
In a similar way, the Disney film primarily places the viewer outside the depicted 
events, turning them into an onlooker sneaking after Alice from camera standpoint to 
camera standpoint. As argued before, it can even be claimed that the film, by 
focusing on Alice’s outward appearance and by stimulating identification with the 
camera, presents an even more objective (again in the technical sense) 
representation than the book. Despite all this, the association with Alice is still a 
primary part of the film’s strategy to increase the viewer’s involvement. As in the 
book, the focus on the character itself already presents an invitation to take her 
perspective when Alice has to make a decision or deal with a difficult situation. When 
Alice is unjustly accused of high-treason and tried in a most conspicuous way, the 
viewer may place themselves in Alice’s shoes and feel indignant at the injustice of 
the accusation, again creating a closer emotional bond. Moreover, like the novel, the 
film presents a number of techniques meant to reinforce this bond by temporarily 
closing the gap between the viewer’s and a character’s viewpoint. When the camera 
takes Alice’s perspective, this constitutes a technique closely related to literary 
focalisation except for the absence of inner monologue. One example of this occurs 
when Alice is tumbling down the well and the camera switches to her perspective, 
first looking up at her cat Dinah on the edge of the Abyss and at the end of the fall 
turning the world upside down as Alice is hanging on her feet from a bar. 
Interestingly, this technique is not restricted to the Alice character: Dinah’s 
perspective is taken to show Alice tumbling down the well. and the perspective of the 
rabbit is taken when the growth of Alice’s legs pushes him violently out the door of 
his own house. Although the character association is more dynamic, the underlying 
technique and goal are similar to those in the book, i.e. to involve the viewer more 
closely in the character’s predicament and subjectify the experience. 
The game, finally, presents itself primarily as a system for generating a subjective 
experience. By inviting the player to step into Alice’s role by controlling her 
movements and assuming her identity and goals, the game pushes them into the 
driver’s seat. Whereas the book and the film invite one to ‘follow’ Alice on her 
adventures, the game invites the player to steer Alice through them. Moreover, by 
employing 3D modelling and by having the world revolve around the player when 
Alice looks around, from the beginning a deep association is established between the 
player and Alice as one unit, urging the player to imagine that they are Alice for the 
length of the playing session.  
Nonetheless, there are several factors that work against the player imagining 
themselves to be in Wonderland. First of all, the player is expected to assume Alice’s 
identity and not their own; they are not allowed to customise their avatar and give it 
their own name. Moreover, unlike its first-person technological predecessor Quake 
III, the game uses a third-person perspective keeping Alice’s back firmly in focus 
throughout the game, again reinforcing the sense of otherness and distance between 
the representation and the player. Then there are the cut-scenes which regularly 
interrupt game play and which without warning wrest control over both Alice and the 
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camera from the player’s hands. Cut-scenes serve such functions as explaining 
different aspects of game play or the game environment, providing background, 
progressing the story or generating suspense by introducing a boss fight, but their 
presence has the significant side-effect of greatly objectifying the experience by 
kicking the player out of their role in the game world. Thus, just like the book and the 
film present a sort of subjective counterweight to their primarily objective 
representation, the game deploys several techniques objectifying aspects of the 
otherwise subjective experience of game play. 
 
Theoretical Considerations 
There are several theoretical implications to the above observations that merit a 
more extensive discussion. First of all, there is the fact that self-imagining in 
representation turns out to be a complex and multifaceted phenomenon. It is neither 
binary nor linear, nor fixed nor constant. All three works show a built-in balance 
between objectivity and subjectivity. In the book and the film the objective position 
prevails, but it is complemented by techniques to draw a person into imagining 
themselves inside the narrative universe. The game, on the other hand, presents 
itself as a primarily subjective experience, but again the context and use of several 
counterbalancing techniques adds objectivity to the mix. How far the presence of this 
type of counterbalancing can be extrapolated to other media and/or works will be 
subject to future research, but if it can be extrapolated, this could tell us something 
about representation itself. Rather than being a clean, bottom-up, technology-driven 
affair, it seems that representation is more of a patchwork of techniques producing a 
hybrid experience, one in which a person is simultaneously invited to step into the 
depicted universe and to retain at least partly an outside perspective and vice versa, 
both legs stretched across the magic circle as it were. Returning to Walton’s 
perspective of representations as tools to share imagining and insight, this hybridity 
need not surprise us. When sharing an experience, it is of primary importance to at 
the same time present a personal view and seduce the other to try the same 
perspective. 
A final observation is that the game setup seems to almost automatically introduce a 
basically subjective experience as opposed to the book and the film which start from 
an objective one. One could try to deduce from this that when an artefact presents a 
person with the possibility to participate in the shaping of the representation, this 
automatically leads to a primarily subjective perspective. When a person is given 
agency, the result must be that they are more closely tied to the represented 
universe and therefore automatically imagine themselves in it. This claim can easily 
be falsified, however, when one looks at instances of electronic literature such as 
Geoff Ryman’s 253 or interactive animation like Donna Leishman’s Deviant (2004) in 
which the visitor is invited to ‘direct’ the story flow by choosing a link or clicking on 
objects rather than by playing a character. In these examples, despite the fact that 
agency is transferred to the reader and viewer, this does not result in a subjective 
viewpoint, quite on the contrary (see also Van Looy 2003b). Next, one could try again 
with the claim that it is not just agency that is required, but a gaming setup. In other 
words, the fact that the player is handed agency and given a role within the game 
universe with attached goals, rules and an identity should evoke a primarily 
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subjective experience. This would correspond to the above findings for American 
McGee’s Alice which invites the player not just to steer the events, but to steer Alice 
through them so as to reach her goal of setting Wonderland and her own mental 
condition straight. Again, there are reservations, however, as a simulation game such 
as Will Wright’s SimCity (Maxis 1989), despite reserving an active role with 
associated goals for the player and even a designated nomination (mayor), will not 
automatically lead to subjective imagining. Hence, it seems that not just agency and 
not just the game setup, but a game setup and a close association with an entity 
within the simulation are a prerequisite for a primarily subjective experience. Future 
research will further explore this claim and attempt to empirically validate it. 
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Notes 
 
1  This research would not have been possible without the generous support from 
the University of Umeå, Sweden, particularly Patrik Svensson from HUMlab, and 
from the Kempe Foundation. 
2  The main focus of this article is on the links between theory and material. For a 
more extensive discussion of the corpus, see Van Looy 2008. 
